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CVE‑2025‑47827 | IGEL | SBB

VulnerabilityCVE‑2025‑47827
TypeImproper Verification of Cryptographic Signature (CWE‑347) allowing Secure Boot bypass
DescriptionIn IGEL OS versions before 11, the igel‑flash‑driver Linux kernel module fails to properly verify cryptographic signatures of SquashFS root filesystem images. This flaw allows mounting of a crafted root filesystem from an unverified SquashFS image, effectively bypassing Secure Boot. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}
Attack VectorLocal (low complexity, unauthenticated). Exploitation requires boot control or local access to modify boot files or the EFI system partition. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
CVSS v3.18.4 (High): AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
Affected VersionsIGEL OS 10 and earlier (all builds prior to version 11) :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
Fixed VersionsIGEL OS 11 and 12 are not affected and correctly enforce Secure Boot signature verification. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
ImpactSecure Boot bypass enables booting of untrusted kernels and root filesystems, persistent bootkits or rootkits, arbitrary kernel-level code execution, privilege escalation, denial of service, and data exfiltration. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}
Exploit / PoCPublic PoC available via GitHub repository with boot process diagram and detailed exploitation steps. :contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6}
Disclosure TimelineVulnerability disclosed May 29, 2025; IGEL and Microsoft notified earlier; IGEL published ISN‑2025‑22 on June 2, 2025. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}
Detection Ideas- Validate boot chain and root filesystem signatures
- Use rootkit detection tools (e.g. rkhunter) to scan for tampering
- Monitor for unexpected SquashFS mounts or tampered boot variables
- Employ firmware integrity monitoring (e.g. Eclypsium) for unexpected EFI components. :contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8}
Mitigation Strategies- Update to IGEL OS 11 or later
- Revoke/distrust signing certificate via DBX/MOKX or firmware, or specifically distrust Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA
- Implement TPM Measured Boot or custom secure boot keys, restrict boot media and firmware access. :contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}
References- NVD entry (CVE‑2025‑47827) :contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}
- IGEL Security Notice ISN‑2025‑22 :contentReference[oaicite:11]{index=11}
- GitHub PoC repository by Zedeldi :contentReference[oaicite:12]{index=12}
- Eclypsium “Hydroph0bia” analysis :contentReference[oaicite:13]{index=13}
- Feedly summary (CVSS, mitigation) :contentReference[oaicite:14]{index=14}