If you happen to be on the island of Bali in October, you can listen to the presentations of our security experts at the SAS 26 conference.
On October 21st at 16:40, Sergey Sidorov and Khaydar Kabibo will present a major research by our redteam in the report “Breaking the Warehouse: From Bluetooth Devices to Operational Control”.
Modern warehouses rely on automation, connected control systems, and operational devices such as wireless barcode scanners and portable data terminals (PDTs). These seemingly simple tools can create an unexpected path into the warehouse network and critical logistics systems.
This talk examines two overlooked attack surfaces. We reverse engineered the RF protocol between barcode scanners and their base stations and found that it can be abused to inject arbitrary keystrokes and commands, enabling remote code execution on Windows and Linux with zero user interaction. The issue is not vendor-specific and affects devices from major vendors, including Honeywell, leading to CVE-2026-4272.
We also explore Android kiosk escapes on PDTs, showing how employees bypass restrictions and how attackers can turn the same techniques into persistent, difficult-to-trace access to the Warehouse Management System (WMS).
Finally, we demonstrate how a compromised operational device can become a foothold for pivoting into the internal network, exploiting WMS weaknesses, and reaching critical logistics processes — and how defenders can break these attack paths.
And on October 22nd at 13:30, at the same conference, in the report “Smash the Tenant Boundary”, our expert Matvey Bukhtoyarov will talk about the possibilities of penetrating another — cloud — infrastructure.
A lot of people think that if their cloud data gets compromised, it’s always because they misconfigured a bucket or left a port open. However, a recent deep-dive penetration test of a large-scale cloud provider proved that critical threats can originate from the provider’s own infrastructure.
This presentation demonstrates how a complete cross-tenant isolation bypass was achieved, leading to the compromise of multiple customer networks. It wasn’t just one magic exploit; it was a beautiful chain of issues. We combined an interesting SSRF-to-RCE vector in a Kubernetes control plane component, picked up leaked SSH keys from logs, and used them to move laterally. From there, we bypassed isolation to hit customer databases and message brokers (Kafka, Postgres, Redis), and finally used an SQL injection in SaltStack to access the cloud’s main metabase.
This presentation is heavily technical and based entirely on a real case. The audience will explore the mechanics of each step, explain the logic behind our attack chain, and show why multi-tenancy in modern clouds might be much more fragile than we think. This research was awarded 2nd place at the Pentest Award 2026 in the “System Hack (Web & Logic)” category.
Come to see these presentations at SAS 26! Or just wait until we publish the details of these reports here (we will do it, but later).
